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Abstract
This thesis is a comparative case study of the social movements of the Mapuche
in Chile and the fourteen indigenous tribes in Ecuador. I study their social movements by
utilizing the structural strain theory of social movements. This theory states that people
in society experience deprivation, the people recognize the deprivation, a solution is
proposed and this ideology is diffused to the society, events occur to begin motion of the
movement, the society (including government) need to be open to change, and
eventually there will be mobilization of resources in order to form a successful social
movement. The dependent variable is the development of a successful social movement
and the independent variables include the manifestations, political climate, and
government representation.
I hypothesize that the lack of unity among Mapuche communities is the primary
cause of social movement failure; however, my research points to a broader cause of
failure. The political trajectory of the country is the primary variable that determines
success or failure because it determines receptiveness to change. Ecuador’s political
climate encourages change, whereas, Chile’s government has, since Pinochet, been
rather stagnant in enacting social change based upon outside forces. The movements’
success requires outside support. Since 1990, Ecuador’s indigenous groups have ousted
two presidents and achieved constitutional recognition, but what do the Mapuche
achieve? With Ecuador’s high indigenous population and its unstable government, the
indigenous social movement is able to gather support from others and provide stability,
whereas in Chile, demands from the indigenous social movement do not have the same
national recognition and relevance.
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Introduction

About 42 million people in Latin America identify as indigenous, which makes up
nearly eight percent of the total population of the region (Hoffay and Rivas 2016).
However, the World Bank reports that they constitute fourteen percent of the poor and
seventeen percent of the very poor in Latin America (Freire et al. 2015). As a result,
indigenous people are vulnerable to exploitation by the government and other for-profit
businesses that target low status populations for personal gain because they place profit
and power in a higher position than the people that their work negatively affects. In
Chile, this power gap is obvious. In Ecuador, some gaps have closed, but the indigenous
people continue to fight for their rights to be recognized.
In the 1880s, Chile’s indigenous Mapuche people were placed on reducciones
(reservations) so that their land could be used for economic development by timber and
hydroelectric companies, among others (Carruthers and Rodriguez 2009). Today, their
land is further removed from their control and more large corporations implement
environmentally destructive projects in the south of Chile. Politicians continuously
promise to help and pass acts to return land to Mapuche control and enforce more
regulations, such as stricter Environmental Impact Statements, but little concrete
improvement follows. On the contrary, the indigenous people in Ecuador have achieved
success in regards to their demands. However, they are not as successful today as they
were in the 1990s and early 2000s. The indigenous people in Ecuador celebrated a
successful ousting of the President and achieved constitutional recognition in Ecuador’s
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new 1998 constitution. However, the indigenous political party, Pachakutik, has lost
momentum since the 2006 election year when they backed candidate Luis Macas,
whereas many indigenous voters supported the opposition, Rafael Correa (Aranda 2016).
It lost many of its supporters and failed to act as a strong political party rather than a
small special interest party. They also struggle with many of the same land rights issues
as the indigenous people of Chile; the indigenous people of Ecuador have not been able
to get their land back, either. Upon first glance, it appears that the Mapuche people of
Chile and the indigenous people of Ecuador, from about fourteen tribes, participate in
many similar activities, such as protests, organization formation, and petitions. Why then
do the Mapuche not celebrate the same success that came in Ecuador?
Since 1990, there has been a renewal in indigenous social movements in Latin
America; therefore, I discuss how indigenous groups—specifically Mapuche in southern
Chile—fight for identity recognition and land reform in the context of social movements. I
compare two cases that have major contrasts in terms of political stability and numbers,
to determine why the Mapuche are unsuccessful, and why Ecuador is not constant in
their success. My hypothesis is that the Mapuche people have not united around one
central cause, therefore, they focus on too many demands and are not united
throughout the country. As a result of lack of unity, they fail to gather the support of the
greater society to enact legislative change.
I guide my research with the theories of social movements; the structural strain
theory describes these movements by explaining the steps necessary—which I will
discuss in detail in Chapter 1—to be successful. I use census data from government
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websites and reports of previous protests, occupations, and other action taken by the
Mapuche, as well as the indigenous people of Ecuador. The census data provides me with
percentages of people that identify as indigenous in various countries, so that I can
analyze the role of representation and the connection with action and success. I look at
the number of protests, as well as the theme of the protest.
I use surveys of Mapuche people in Chile, as well as other Chileans reported by
the Centro de Estudios Públicos in Chile. There are surveys related to identity,
urbanization, and the environment. This data is important to understand views towards
Mapuche by non-indigenous people to determine if this plays a role in Mapuche
achieving political goals. It is also important to demonstrate the Mapuche presence in
rural and urban areas and their potential for social movements because social
movements rely on a shared identity.
The Estudio Nacional de Opinion reports surveys. I use these answers to
determine the political context of Ecuador and Chile and look at similarities and
differences. Survey questions also report identity opinions and how constituents,
indigenous and non-indigenous, feel organizations represent them. I use a conflict
tracker to analyze where and why protest events occur. LAPOP reports data collected to
show what citizens believe to be the biggest problems in Chile and Ecuador, as well as the
percentage of people who participate in manifestations.
I compare the Chilean Mapuche case with a more successful indigenous social
movement in Ecuador. I compare two indigenous groups that each participate in protests
and have indigenous organizations to represent them, the Confederation of Indigenous
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Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) and Coordinadora Arauca-Malleco (CAM), and analyze
what differs that would allow one to be successful and one to fail to achieve their goals. I
use the collective case-study method, a multi-case study with cases in different locations,
through my focus on the Chilean Mapuche and the indigenous people of Ecuador. I
compare the cases with the variables—number of manifestations, political climate of the
country, and group organization—to determine why the Mapuche have not been able to
form a successful social movement.
The dependent variable is the development of a successful social movement. In
successful cases, policy will be implemented but also followed through. In failed cases, no
policy will be offered, or there will be no follow through. I will mention specific laws to
determine answers to protests, or other actions. By looking at the similarities of the
independent variables, number of manifestations, political climate of the country, and
group organization, among multiple indigenous groups, I will analyze why the outcomes
may be different.
I use Mill’s Method of Difference, which compares cases to determine what they
do not have in common. The variable they do not have in common is the cause. This
helps determine what is missing that makes social movements successful. Why do some
movements actually work while others do not? How did the indigenous people in
Ecuador establish a plurinationalist state, but the Mapuche cannot achieve their goal of
land reclamation?
My research fails to support my hypothesis that the failure of the indigenous
social movement in Chile comes as a result of a lack of unity throughout the country on

4

specific claims. Based on the structural strain theory of social movements, the primary
reason that Ecuador has had success and Chile does not is that the government must be
receptive to change. An unstable government, like that of Ecuador, creates an
atmosphere in which change is welcome because there is uncertainty of the future.
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework

In this chapter I explain three of the most prominent theories of social
movements that help my analysis as to why the Mapuche indigenous community has not
formed a successful social movement in Chile, but the indigenous people in Ecuador have
achieved success in their social movement. Social movements are sustained mobilization
of a group of organized people that share a common claim. The three theories in which I
focus are the resource mobilization theory, the structural strain theory, and the new
social movement theories. The theory that best explains the successes and failures of the
indigenous groups in Chile and Ecuador is the structural strain theory.

1.1 Social Movement Theories
Social movements are defined as sustained mobilization of a group of organized
people for a common cause and purpose (Tilly 2008). They are comprised of social
interactions with a campaign that develops when a group has a claim and a challenge.
Examples of social interactions include city meetings, protest events, and petition
campaigns, among others. In the case of Chile’s Mapuche, the claim is that large
corporations are infringing upon historically Mapuche land. In Ecuador, the indigenous
people had success in their campaign for constitutional recognition. I frame my thesis
around social movements because social movements are a change agent that are
observable from the outside. They publicize priorities of a specific group that is united
around common causes. Therefore, it is possible to observe how indigenous people are
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marginalized and what they are doing, or not doing, to increase their visibility in the
political scene and what rights they are awarded as a result of their efforts.
The basis of a social movement is a campaign that requires organized public effort
to make collective claims on target identities. They utilize certain unifiers that project
their claims, such as coalitions, public meetings, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petitions,
statements to and in public media, and pamphleteering. However, these actions alone do
not constitute social movements. Charles Tilly explains social movements on the basis of
the “WUNC display,” which stands for worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment. A
cause must be worthy of action for a social movement to emerge. Unity comes in the
form of matching clothing, marching in ranks, or chanting. Numbers can represent
number of signatures on a petition, number of people participating in a protest, or
number of messages from constituents. Commitment means that representatives of a
social movement will brave bad weather, will remain fighting even when they face
challenges, and are not willing to waver for the betterment of the masses. Sidney Tarrow
argues that the most important aspects, since the emergence of social movements, are
print and association; therefore, media is necessary to form a community and diffuse
claims to the masses (Tarrow 1998, 53).
What differentiates a social movement from a social or political organization is
that a social movement is a network of different actors that all have a common claim. An
organization can be a part of that network, but it is not a social movement in and of itself.
A social movement is not an individual protest, or conflict, but these events can help to
mobilize and recruit for the actual social movement. Social movements can demonstrate
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the current attitudes and culture of a specific group and they are interactive.
Democratization can provide the platform for social movements to emerge; this explains
the timeline of the emergence of the Mapuche social movement in Chile, which came
shortly after the dictatorship of Pinochet ended.
There are multiple levels of successes that social movements can achieve. Even if
not all demands are met, a social movement can still be successful. One indicator of
success is the extension of democratic rights, such as in the case of Ecuador, through the
adoption of multicultural constitutional frameworks. Success can also be seen as a group
gains political leverage through connections with the state; through this, steady action in
favor of their group can be achieved. Collective identities encourage collective action,
which is the basis of social movement theories.
There are five major approaches to study social movements, but I focus on three:
the resource mobilization theory, the structural strain theory, and the new social
movement theories. The resource mobilization theory (Tilly 2006) says that social
movements emerge when resources such as money, labor, media, and other support can
be used to mobilize on behalf of a stated cause. The structural strain theory says that
social movements need six things to grow: deprivation, recognition of a problem by the
people, a proposed solution, an event to spark the movement, a society and government
that are open to change, and mobilization of resources. New social movement theories
look at causes of collective action in politics, culture, and ideology instead of just
economics. While each is similar and has aspects of the others, each offers certain
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indicators of success. The movement of the Mapuche and indigenous people of Ecuador
can best be understood in terms of the structural strain theory.

Resource Mobilization Theory
The resource mobilization theory was one of the theories that emerged in the
1960s as social movements, such as the Civil Rights movement, began to change and new
theories were needed to understand widespread participation in the movements. Charles
Tilly, an American sociologist, is one of the most prominent resource mobilization
theorists. The critique of this theory is that it does not explain how social movements
have been successful with scarce resources. The resource mobilization theory says that a
group in society that has certain grievances, may be able to alleviate these grievances
with the mobilization of resources. However, the grievances themselves are not what
cause the formation of social movements; grievances are constant and social movements
emerge when there is a change in group resources, or organization (Tilly). These
resources include money, labor, social status, knowledge, support of the media, and
support from the elite, among other resources (Sen 2016, 126). In the world today with
an increased importance of technology, one of the most important resources is the
media.
The resource mobilization theory contrasts with traditional theories in that
traditional theories offer a broader view of what is considered a social movement. The
resource mobilization theory alludes to change that hopes to “alter elements of social
structure and/or the reward distribution of society” (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1218). This

9

theory states that movements are against institutional elites and the organizers of social
movements are often largely excluded from government. It usually focuses on actors that
fight for institutional power, such as the indigenous communities. Often times, described
by this theory, successful social movements employ a “conscience constituency” that
includes supporters from the affluent elite, such as government organizations, mass
media, and business corporations (McCarthy and Zald 1973). The indigenous social
movements in Chile and Ecuador are best understood using a different theory. This
theory offers a broader approach, so success is more easily understood with the
specificity of the structural strain theory.

Structural Strain Theory
The structural strain theory offers specific guidelines for social movements to
follow. It was proposed by Smelser in 1965. Smelser’s theory says that social movements
need six things in order to be successful: people in society experience deprivation, the
people recognize the deprivation, a solution is proposed and this ideology is diffused to
the society, events occur to begin motion of the movement, the society (including
government) need to be open to change, and eventually there will be mobilization of
resources (Sen 2016, 127). There is a strain in the organization of a group, or
government, that offers the social movement room to move. The most prominent
criticism of this theory is that it relies on cooperation between the elite and the group for
a social movement to emerge. Therefore, it says that success cannot occur if the elite is
not receptive and accepting of the group that is the main player in a social movement.
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This theory helps to explain the United States civil rights movement of the 1960s.
Although black people were in a better position in the 1960s than in the 1870s, they
recognized the opportunity in the 1960s to create a successful movement because the
structure of the United States was changing and it gave power to others. This is similar to
the case of Ecuador because Ecuador has had an unstable government, which allows
others to take power.
This differs from the resource mobilization theory. The resource mobilization
theory recognizes that resources are constant and a change in resources available is the
primary cause of mobilization, whereas the structural strain theory says that while
resources are important, the society must be open to change, so the strain in society is
the primary mobilizer. The indigenous people have recognized deprivation since the
Spanish inquisition, but they did not form a social movement until they had adequate
resources to do so and did not have support when there were strains in society. The
structural strain theory places importance on a catalizing event. An example is the bus
incident involving Rosa Parks that sparked the civil rights movement in the United States
in the 1960s, or a week-long protest in Ecuador’s capital, Quito. The structural strain
theory recognizes that institutional change can only occur if the six factors I previously
discussed are present. I use the structural strain theory to guide my analysis.

New Social Movement Theories
The new social movement theories emerged in the 1960s to the 1980s alongside
the movements involving women and the LGBTQIA+ community in the 1960s (Tarrow
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1998, 17). New social movements focus more on culture than any previous theory
because they intend to explain the deficiencies of Marxism; yet, they do share some
Marxist ideas, such as the exploitation of social classes. Marxism supported socioeconomic class as the main component of a collective group that would participate in
social movements. Whereas, new social movement theories use identity, such as
sexuality, ethnicity, and gender to explain causal factors of social movements and places
less emphasis on the importance of socio-economic class (Sen 2016, 128). Jurgen
Habermas and Alain Touraine are the primary new social movement theorists. They say
that new social movement theories focus on the exploitation of one societal class over
another, instead of the socioeconomic class. New social movement theories give many
explanations for why and how a group achieves success. This is the greatest criticism of
this theory because it groups many different movements into one type and fails to
discuss the conflict between different socioeconomic classes.
Scholars that study new social movements argue that there is not one explanation
of why a social movement is successful. As social movements change topics, audiences
change, and government changes, a new theory must be utilized to understand what is
occurring because no two movements are exactly the same. One scholar, Alberto
Melucci, says that new social movements go beyond goals of material gain; they also
resist the expansion of the government and defend personal autonomy (Della Porta 13).
New social movement theories help researchers to understand the environmentalist
movement, the women’s movement, and the anti-globalization movement. These aid to
the understanding of social movements because they are worldwide, unify millions of

12

people, and change their claims as they gain successes and as society changes. This
theory closely aligns with some of the goals of the Mapuche in Chile and the fourteen
indigenous groups in Ecuador, but it fails to explain success. Since the Spanish Inquisition,
the indigenous people place importance on their own identity, so it cannot explain the
social movements now apart from the past. It cannot explain successes and failures
because it is something constant. Therefore, I focus on the structural strain theory.

13

Chapter 2: History of Indigenous People in Chile and Ecuador

In this chapter, I offer a brief background of the Mapuche in Chile and the
indigenous people in Ecuador split between fourteen tribes, as well as a specific event
that occurred as a result of the social movement led by the indigenous people in Chile. I
focus specifically on the Mapuche in Chile because they comprise about 85% of the
indigenous population in Chile and are the most vocal group; whereas the indigenous
groups in Ecuador are more evenly split and have a group which unites them, called
CONAIE, so I analyze the events of their collective action. The fourteen tribes that make
up the indigenous population of Ecuador are Tsáchila, Chachi, Epera, Awa, Quichua,
Shuar, Achuar, Shiwiar, Cofán, Siona, Secoya, Zápara, Andoa y Waorani, and AfroEcuadorians. I chose to focus on Chile as a result of personal experience in Chile studying
the Mapuche. Ecuador provided an interesting contrast because the indigenous groups
celebrated success, yet are now less successful. I explore key changes in the rights and
organizations of the Mapuche and present the deprivations that the indigenous people
face and attitudes towards them. I present the Ralco Dam case that is an important
image of the greater social movement; the Mapuche people failed to achieve land
reform, but the national government gave the appearance that they were willing to enact
reform to satisfy the demands of the Mapuche. I mention the legal battles that occur
between the state, the indigenous communities and the private, for-profit corporations.
Finally, I give a brief history of the indigenous people in Ecuador, including the
development of a social movement with some successes and some failures.
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2.1 The Mapuche in Chile
The Mapuche are a group of indigenous people located in Chile and Argentina.
There are many Mapuche communities throughout Chile that are, or have ancestors that
are, united in their shared history, language, social upbringing, and economy. They are
people of the land; their economy and social traditions are traditionally based upon
agriculture. Now Chilean citizens, many Mapuche have migrated to urban areas to
support their families, yet many still have a strong indigenous identity and are involved in
the Mapuche conflict surrounding land reform and identity recognition.
The Mapuche constitute the largest group of indigenous people in Chile. They
make up about 9% of the total population of Chileans, with almost 1.5 million Chilean
Mapuches (Freire et al. 2015). They are predominately located in region IX of Chile, called
the Araucanía located south of Santiago, and Santiago, the capital in the center of the
country. After they were defeated by the Chilean state in 1883, they were forced from
their land into areas known as reducciones, or reservations, so that the land could be
used for economic gain by the Chilean government and businesses and so that the
Chilean government may create national homogeny (Consejo Nacional 2011, 23). The
Chilean government auctioned off the remaining land to settlers and colonization
companies, while further dividing the reducciones, so that the Mapuche were stripped of
their land and were forced to be dependent upon the rest of the country rather than be
self-sufficient. They went beyond stripping land; the Chilean state forced Christianity and
the use of Spanish upon the Mapuche people through language programs and Christian
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schooling for the children (Gómez 2012). The government said that national security was
synonymous with national homogeneity. By the early twentieth century, the Mapuche
people were living on only five percent of their original land plots and they were living on
the least productive land in the Araucanía region. Traditionally, their lifestyle depends
upon the land for food, medicine, and entertainment, so it is necessary to have
productive, nutrient-rich soil to cultivate their food.
Mapuche people began to organize and fought for a voice in the national arena
early in Chilean history. However, there was little advancement in the recognition of
Mapuche rights. Some of the early organizations and demonstrations of Mapuche people
began in 1906, the same year as the presidential election of Pedro Montt who expanded
railroads to stimulate copper production. The early organizations were led by Mapuche
teachers and businessmen because they were educated. An organization was formed
which spoke a different language than Spanish, Mapudungun, which threatened the
homogeneity as seen through the eyes of the Chilean government. In the 1920s, two
Mapuche men, Manuel Manquilef and Francisco Melivilu, were elected to Congress,
which signifies a small step towards Mapuche representation, but two members of
Congress does not sway a vote with great force.
Furthermore, two presidents, Eduardo Frei Montalva and Salvador Allende had
ambitious land reform propositions and restored about 70,000 hectares of land before
the dictatorship of Pinochet re-severed ties (Rodriguez and Carruthers 2008, 4). Eduardo
Frei Montalva represented the Christian Democrat Party and was president from 1964 to
1970. He ran on the promise of reform; his political goals included alleviation of poverty,
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and the rural Mapuche are often times impoverished, as are other Chileans that live the
same region. His successor, Salvador Allende was a Marxist who was also concerned with
reform. Both men worked on land reform that nationalized land, but redistributed some
agricultural land back to its owners. In 1971, the president intended to give some land
back to the Mapuche, but by 1973, the regime of Pinochet began that reversed all
progress and promised to open more of the land of the indigenous community to
privatization. Pinochet allowed only 6 hectares of land per family and provided subsidies
and tax breaks to timber companies to develop in the Araucanía region of Chile in Decree
Law 701, for the economic gain of the country (Carruthers and Rodriguez 2009).
The fall of Pinochet in 1990 led to the renewal of indigenous social movements in
Chile because a dictatorship does not give the people freedom to campaign; a
democratic government allows social movements to form. However, after Pinochet’s
reign, it was still difficult to reform institutions put in place by Pinochet, so it was difficult
for any group to have their demands met on a governmental level. Instead, the Chilean
state was most focused upon reinstating themselves in the world economy through
encouragement of economic growth and diversification of exports (Aranda 2016). The
presidents that followed Pinochet were concerned with human rights, but they were
most focused on alleviating hunger and poverty to achieve national co-existence rather
than meeting the demands of specific groups of people. Furthermore, some laws leftover
from the Pinochet regime hinder Mapuche movement. The government, education
system, and media remain highly conservative with most things privatized; it is difficult to
change every system with just a change in presidency. The 1987 and 1988 Constitutional
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Organic Law of Political Parties, leftover from Pinochet, makes it difficcult for a Mapuche
political party, Wallmapuwen, to form because it divides the system into a political right
and left and decides representation based upon the two political parties, so a third
special interest party cannot compete (Aranda 2016).
In May of 1990, there was a special commission for indigenous people with the
Concertación, a central-left alliance in Chile, to create a new, stronger relationship with
the state (Carruthers and Rodriguez 2009). This created the foundations for the
Indigenous Law of 1993. Throughout this time, the Mapuche families ultimately had a
goal of land recovery and identity recognition. The Chilean Congress passed the
Indigenous Law in 1993 that created CONADI (National Corporation for Indigenous
Development), to work with the state as agents to promote indigenous rights, yet the
indigenous people are not in positions of power in this organization (Rodriguez and
Carruthers 2008, 5). Shortly after, Congress created the Land and Water Fund to buy land
back and transfer it back to its original owners; however, this was not highly successful. In
1997, the descendants of 85 indigenous families initiated the land recovery process; but,
a company hoping to develop on their land fought back. This led to a protest that ended
in logging trucks in flames and 12 Mapuche arrests. The roadblocks and protest did not
end with those arrests; but, they continue to this day (Carruthers and Rodriguez 2009).
Formed in 1998, Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco, or CAM, is a Mapuche-led
organization dedicated to its claim of land recovery. Members occupy former Mapuche
land in order to fight for land recovery from privatized companies (Kowalczyk 2013, 122).
They are unwilling to unite with most other elite groups in order to prove their
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independence, which leads to its low success rate. They are anti-capitalism and antisystemic, so they are often criminalized. They are even labeled a terrorist organization
through “Operation Patience” in 2002 (Kowalczyk 2013, 132). While they have been
successful in recovering some land, they will never achieve full success if they do not
unite with others to increase their numbers, create a more peaceful image, and negotiate
with the institution, or the government.
The social movement of the Mapuche people centers around the protection of
land and their rights that protect their individuality as indigenous instead of Chilean. One
important demonstration of their social movement that shows their resilience, but also
their repressed status, is the events that unfolded on the Bío Bío river at the proposed
site of Ralco Dam. In the upper Bío Bío river basin in the heart of the Mapuche territory,
construction began on a dam that would force relocation of Mapuche people from their
land. The creation of this dam flooded Mapuche territory, which led to erosion of the soil,
consequently sucking nutrients from their farmland. In the end, Endesa, the hydroelectric
company, completed construction on the dam and the Chilean state promised to pay
reparations to the Mapuche, but very few families actually benefitted from the
government repayment (Vergara 2013). It included more empty promises and did not
make the relationship between the state and the Mapuche stronger. The Mapuche had
small successes in their protest of this project, but their goal was to halt construction
entirely and it was ultimately completed.
Since 1990, the Mapuche have been consistently demonized in the media. They
are often portrayed in the news as violent beings who will burn equipment and halt
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economic growth in their country. One news article bearing the title, “In Chile’s forests,
shadowy rebel groups threaten logging industry,” by journalist Gram Slattery, describes
the Mapuche as people who “sabotage” and describes the fear that they invoke in their
protests. However, when it benefits them, the government strategically uses the
indigenous people for their personal support and gain. At government speeches and
events, there will often be traditionally dressed machi, women of power in Mapuche
communities, on stage to represent how accepting the Chilean state is and how they are
supporting all diverse group of people (Warren 2009). Yet, in 2020, the Mapuche people
do not have the same freedom as the other Chileans. The protests and events that take
place under the indigenous social movement of the Mapuche are not successful despite
their tireless work and persistence.

2.2 The Ralco Dam Case and the Forestry Industry
In 1989, President Aylwin signed the Nueva Imperial Agreement which promised
constitutional recognition of indigenous people in Chile, as well as the protection of their
land rights. However, neither of these promises were met and Ralco Dam opened in 2004
which flooded Mapuche territory at the Bio Bío river in Chile—a Mapuche lifeline located
just 350 miles south of Chile’s capital city, Santiago (Richards 2005, 208). Endesa Chile, or
Empresa Nacional de Electricidad, is the largest hydroelectric company of Chile and was
privatized in 1988 with its primary shareholders consisting of the armed forces and upper
class (Jana 1997). They are responsible for the construction of Ralco Dam, that is
reported to provide nine percent of Chile’s power requirements, just one of seven
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planned projects along the Bío Bío river (Endesa 2004). Endesa’s projects are located
along the Bío Bío Alto where some of the remaining native forests are located. The
projects include construction of roads which allow forest access to logging companies.
They developed relocation projects for the affected Mapuche communities, but only to
alleviate pressure by human rights activists and the indigenous communities. The dam
damaged rightfully Mapuche land, removed Mapuche people from locations where they
have a shared culture with their community, and blocked access to the river from which
the indigenous people live. The plans to provide aid to the indigenous communities do
not meet requests by the communities themselves. The company that worked on the
dam often worked without permits and took no consideration in protecting territory,
such as ancestral graves (Barba 2018).
The Ralco Dam case demonstrates a specific experience of the Mapuche people
that shows how the Chilean state takes advantage of the vulnerable Mapuche
community of the Bío Bío region for economic gain. Although protected by law under the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, local governments and
other citizens still do not recognize the rights of the Mapuche people in Chile. The
Mapuche people make up 9% of the Chilean population, yet have little support to keep
their culture alive in urban settings, such as Santiago (Becerra 2018). Therefore,
indigenous groups must make themselves visible in the political scene by staging protests
against their exploitation. The protests often come in the form of property destruction;
they burn equipment that loggers use. The Mapuche people showed their support for
Standing Rock in the United States; they put a face to the fight against land and
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environmental exploitation that happens all over the world. The disregard of indigenous
land rights is a human rights issue and it establishes a hierarchy of power of nonindigenous people above indigenous people. Indigenous people are marginalized and, as
a result, violence often erupts. The emergence of Ralco Dam and the logging and forestry
industries provide an example of the social movement regarding the fight for Mapuche
land legitimacy.
Sisters Berta and Nicolasa Quintremán led the Ralco Dam protests. Nicolasa
Quintremán was not able to be buried in her ancestral cemetery because of the presence
of Ralco Hydroelectric Dam, the dam she fought so hard against, but ultimately did not
succeed in halting the. The Endesa electricity company that implemented the dam
displaced the remains of people from 92 Mapuche families for the dam’s construction
without warning; they also used tear gas and home invasions in response to the peaceful
blockades to suppress opposition (Vergara 2013). Quintremán and her sister peacefully
blocked the streets to stop construction, which resulted in new environmental
protections after years of protests. The protections said that companies must provide a
more in-depth study of environmental impacts before the implementation of projects,
such as the building of dams. In the end, the dam was built to provide electricity to Chile
and Mapuche people were relocated with the empty promises of scholarships and
housing utilities. The protests failed to stop the dam’s construction, but they succeeded
in the implementation of environmental protections. Although the protests at Ralco Dam
achieved one small success, the indigenous people failed to achieve land reform and the
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success they achieved did not directly benefit the indigenous communities, it just forced
compliance with environmental regulations.
The logging and forestry industries have come under the greatest attack by the
indigenous communities, because companies, subsidized under Pinochet, come and
possess land that is supposed to be Mapuche land and do not respect territory rights of
the Mapuche (Richards 2005, 208). Pine and Eucalyptus plantations surround Mapuche
villages and leech nutrients from soil and make agriculture almost impossible for the
Mapuche people who depend on the agriculture for their food and incomes. As a result,
many Mapuche take part in land sabotage, land occupation, and equipment burning of
logging and forestry companies. This leads to violent encounters between Mapuche and
the police. The Benetton Corporation, an Italian fashion brand, bought a large portion of
land from the government at subsidized prices. This land is land on which the Mapuche
people lived. The Benetton Corporation diverts the water source from the local Mapuche
community for their own use in logging, raising livestock, and fossil fuel extraction. This
results in animal deaths, drought, and displacement (Reuque and Mallon 2002, 14).
Corporate leaders agreed to meet Mapuche leaders to discuss the issue, but failed to
show up at the scheduled meeting time, so the Mapuche reacted in violence. The
Araucanía region, in the southern part of Chile, is considered a red zone of conflict and
houses many of the logging industries that take over Mapuche land (Barba 2018).
The Ralco Hydroelectric Plant produces 690 megawatts of electricity, but at what
cost? While economic opportunity is pertinent in society, the government must offer
reparations for resources it removes from its owners. It forced relocation of a community
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without repayment and it flooded a gravesite and homes. The construction workers
utilized tear gas and violence against the indigenous community. It led to a long-standing
legal battle over indigenous land rights. Two chairs and two advisors of the National
Commission of Indigenous Development were forced to resign because they opposed the
construction of the dam, so this group was delegitimized. Formed to protect and project
the interests of the indigenous minority, the removal of those that voiced the opinions of
the indigenous people were simply forced to resign so that the group would represent
the opinion of the state. With every effort of the Mapuche people, the Chilean state and
the company constructing the dam, Endesa, further diminished the status of the
indigenous population. Some reparations were paid to four affected families, but the
dam was completed, which establishes the fact that the state will always have more
power than the indigenous people whose land is supposed to be protected (Gónzales
2004). Because land reform is one of the main goals of the Mapuche and they cannot
maintain a leadership seat in the organization that determines land reform, the social
movement fails. This is also a goal that does not benefit the country as a whole, or even a
majority because the forestry and hydroelectric companies are a large influencer in the
economy.

2.3 Indigenous People in Ecuador
The percentage of indigenous people in Ecuador is greater than that of Chile—it is
estimated to be about 25%, but up to 75% of Ecuadorians report as mestizos, or mixed.
The group with the most representation are the Quichua people, but there are about 14
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other indigenous people in Ecuador including both the Andean and Amazonian Quichua,
Jivaroan, Záparo, Waorani, Cofán, Tucanoan, Barbacoan, and others (Whitten 2003, xiii).
Since 1990 and the renewal of indigenous social movements in Latin America, the
indigenous people of Ecuador have enjoyed a number of successes. Some of their
greatest successes came in the forms of electing a President, removing two presidents
from office, and advocating for a plurinational state. They still face challenges today
because of the state’s interest in oil and mining opportunities on indigenous territory, but
they have a voice in the workings of the government. The diverse indigenous groups are
united by the idea that they are “people united.” At many of their strikes and takeovers,
the people involved in the social movement chant “El pueblo, unido, jamás será vencido,”
which means “people together will never be defeated (Whitten 2003, xiii). Used as a
phrase in every Spanish speaking country, the indigenous people in Ecuador created an
organization to show their dedication to their unity.
In Ecuador in the 1980s, there was a debt crisis that unfairly affected indigenous
people through an increase in the number of unpaid indigenous workers. Corporations
paid indigenous people less for equal work. This led to a heightened sense of indigenous
identity to unite the differing indigenous tribes for a common purpose. In 1986 came the
formation of CONAIE, the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de Ecuador
(Jameson 2011). This organization is one by the indigenous people, for the people and its
main purpose is to unify indigenous groups throughout the country and create an agenda
of demands. The mission statement is similar to that of CONADI, but it differs in that it is
an organization by the indigenous people, something that is not present with the
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indigenous people in Chile to the same extent. CONAIE created the plurinational concept,
that would formally recognize the coexistence of multiple ethnicities in the country and
provide that all groups have rights. Between 1995 and 2001, in the peak of their fight for
a plurinational state, the indigenous people of Ecuador ranked first in number of arrests,
second in number of protest events, and fourth in the number of deaths and injuries—
they were relentless and would not stop their efforts until they were awarded rights
(Jameson 2011). In order to be a national player on the governmental level, CONAIE
served as a mechanism for the movement to project itself into national debates.
In 1990, an indigenous uprising led to road blockages to assert their political
power and demonstrate their relentlessness. Alongside this was a central meeting of the
indigenous people to discuss 16 demands around which they would unite. Two of these
demands are “the declaration of Ecuador as a plurinational state” and “the return of
lands and the legalization of territories for the indigenous people, without costly legal
fees” (Jameson 2011). They adopted a system of communication from the Spanish that
elected local leaders, called cabildos, that would make decisions to be consulted at a
national level. Cabildos function like small towns with elected mayors and
councilmembers to make decisions, so it is organized to represent a group of people.
What brought the indigenous movement to the center of economic policy making
was the junta to oust President Jamil Mahuad in 2000 after he gave too much power over
the economy to a group from the United States, the Harvard Boys. He froze bank
accounts, so inflation rose 60% and the poor and working class people were unable to
convert their Ecuadorian dollars into more valuable US dollars. The economy plummeted
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and people lost 75% of their purchasing power while Mahuad’s popularity declined from
60% to 6% (Whitten 2003, 1). The junta demonstrated the organization of the indigenous
people and their ability to inspire change through a military revolt led by Lucio Gutiérrez.
The indigenous people successfully made contact and received help from the armed
forced that guarded the Legislative Palace in Quito. At 10:00am on January 21, 2000, the
national police signaled to the armed forces to draw back, which allowed thousands of
indigenous, and nonindigenous supporters, to enter the palace and wave a national flag
(Whitten 2003, 1). They dictated on national television that “El pueblo está en poder,” or
“the people are in power.” The President was ousted and the indigenous people
demonstrated their influence and their ability to fight for the betterment of their people,
but also the country as a whole. To further strengthen a working relationship between
the government and the indigenous people is the referendum on dollarization. The
indigenous people gathered one million signatures to reject dollarization, which
describes the process of aligning currency with the United States dollar. Although the
referendum ultimately failed, this indicates the voice they have on a national level and
shifts the movement away from just conceptual ideas; they are strategically working
towards their demands. However, the indigenous demands were sidelined quickly after
they ousted Mahuad. Opposition to Mahuad came from other sectors of people in the
debt crisis, so CONAIE had the support of other elite, including the military. In a way, this
occurrence described CONAIE’s weakness: they depend on military, or other elite support
(Bowen 2011, 470).
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In 2002, the foreign minister, minister of agriculture, and minister of education
were indigenous. These are strategic cabinet positions because the indigenous people
demand land rights, as well as equal education and indigenous education in schools
(Jameson 2011). The indigenous people of Ecuador recognize what policy goals of the
government officials are aligned with their own to advance their demands. Their
constitutional reform demand was granted in 2008 by President Correa. Although the
indigenous people of Ecuador still have goals to fight for, their social movement was far
more successful than the social movement of the Chilean Mapuche. In this thesis, I
present the data that indicates why this is true and what the Chilean Mapuche may do to
achieve more successes.
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Chapter 3: Data/Analysis

3.1 Methodology
I compare the Chilean Mapuche case with a more successful indigenous social
movement in Ecuador. I compare two indigenous groups that each participate in protests
and have organizations to represent them, CONAIE in Ecuador and CAM in Chile, and
analyze what differs that would allow one to be successful and one to fail to achieve their
goals. I primarily focus on the Mapuche in Chile, rather than the indigenous people of
Ecuador, to explore why the Mapuche are not successful. I utilize the case of Ecuador to
provide a contrast as to what is occurring, or not occurring in Chile. I compare the cases
with the variables—number of manifestations, group organization, manifestation
demands, and representation to determine why the Mapuche have not been able to
form a successful social movement. Success is defined as the ability to form a bottom-up
indigenous group that has clear, measurable goals that it achieves on a governmental
level. My thesis tests my hypothesis that Chilean Mapuche are unable to create a
successful social movement because their demands are not unified between all
Mapuche. I measure this claim through an analysis of surveys that indicate what
Mapuche and non-Mapuche people in different regions believe to be the biggest issues,
topics of individual protests, and goals stated by different groups that claim to represent
the indigenous population. I use the theories of social movements, specifically the
structural strain theory, to guide my thesis. I briefly introduce the relationship between
the Mapuche and the state. Then I analyze the development of a successful social
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movement, as a result of voting action, political environment, and manifestations in
conjunction with the theories of social movements that were discussed in Chapter 1.
I begin by comparing the formation and foundation of the indigenous social
movement in both Chile and in Ecuador. I then discuss CONAIE and CAM and analyze
specific events they have formed a part of and their relationship with the state and the
indigenous people they claim to represent. CONAIE proves to be a better representation
and agent for change than CAM, so I analyze why this occurs to help answer my
hypothesis and why the Chilean Mapuche are unable to form a group of the same caliber.
To follow, I present election results for city council of areas in Chile that have a high
density of Mapuche. I use this information to analyze their ability to enact change on a
governmental level through their representation. The Mapuche represent a much smaller
proportion of the population than the indigenous people of Ecuador, so it makes sense
that they would be marginalized. Therefore, I analyze the numbers of representatives in
regions with a high density of Mapuche people in Chile and discuss their failure to enact
legislative change in areas where they have representation to analyze how numbers
affect their success. Political party existence and platform is used as an indicator of
success in representation, as well.
The dependent variable is the development of a successful social movement. In
successful cases, policy will be implemented but also followed through. This is
measurable through constitutional change, government representation, or the passage
of laws. In failed cases, no policy will be offered, or there will be no follow through. The
independent variables will include the actions being done, such as protests, burnings,
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strikes, as well as campaign organization, such as presence of public meetings, petitions,
and political climate to determine which affects the dependent variable. By looking at the
similarities of the independent variables among multiple indigenous groups, I will analyze
why the outcomes may be different.
I use Mill’s Method of Difference, which compares cases to determine what they
do not have in common. The variable they do not have in common is the cause that
indicates why one group celebrates success while the other fails. How did the indigenous
people in Ecuador establish a plurinationalist state, but the Mapuche cannot achieve
their goal of land reclamation and constitutional recognition?

3.2 Analysis
I analyze the development of a successful social movement through the use of the
following independent variables: representation, manifestations, and political climate. In
order to be successful, social movements require the mobilization of a large group of
people for a common cause with a common purpose (Tilly 2004). They require a specific
claim. Indigenous people in Chile and Ecuador have formed social movements, yet the
movement in Ecuador has seen both success and failure and Chile’s case is largely
unsuccessful. My data, that I will present in this section, indicates that the indigenous
people of Ecuador achieve success because they have a closer relationship with the state
when the state is experiencing a strain, and are more unified in their demands across
manifestations. On the contrary, the indigenous people of Chile are far too separated in
their demands among individual groups of people, they do not have the same numbers
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as Ecuador, and they do not have a close relationship with the relatively stable state to
be able to implement change.
The cases of Ecuador and Chile share some similarities. The social movements
strengthened, as they often do, in times of political turmoil. In the 1980s, the debt crisis
in Ecuador strengthened the sense of indigenous identity and led them to band together
to fight when fewer indigenous people were offered paid employment and had to
compete with other skilled laborers for the available jobs. Whereas, in Chile, the
indigenous social movements emerged after Pinochet was forced out of office, because a
new government formed that was more receptive to change and democratic
representation than a dictatorship, like that of Pinochet. Therefore, a political crisis unites
those with a common identity and encourages a platform to mobilize. Both countries
have this in common, so this does not indicate the reason the Chilean Mapuche are
unable to create a successful social movement. This aligns with the structural strain
theory. Although both groups experienced constant grievances before they formed, the
social structure was altered which offered indigenous groups a political environment in
which strains are recognized.
Chile and Ecuador each have organizations through which the indigenous people
are provided a platform to communicate with the government and project national
debates. According to the structural strain theory, this diffusion of ideas into society is
pertinent to success. While both countries have indigenous social movements, that of
Ecuador is more successful, in part because it has an indigenous-run organization that
has goals that align more closely with other non-indigenous groups, whereas the Chilean
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CAM is demonized and labeled a terrorist organization (Kowalcyzk 2013, 132). In Chile,
there is also an organization called CONADI that supposedly works for indigenous rights,
but is not so much a representative of the Mapuche people, but a bureaucratic office
within Chile’s development ministry. Therefore, CONAIE’s equivalent is CAM. The
Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, or CONAIE, is the organization of
Ecuador. It was formed in 1986 to strengthen indigenous identity and achieve land
recuperation and a plurinationalist state. Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco, or CAM was
created in 1998 to diffuse the idea of and begin the fight for land reclamation. However,
CONAIE is more productive than CAM. CONAIE successfully removed two presidents:
President Bucaram in 1997 and Jamil Mahuad in 2000. In 2002, Lucio Gutiérrez was
elected president with 55% of the vote (Jameson 2011). Pachakutik, the indigenous
political party of Ecuador, helped him win the election through their support. CONAIE had
a close relationship with the government, largely as a result of their referendum on
dollarization of the Ecuadorian economy. They collected one million signatures on a
petition to oppose dollarization and led road blockages and protests to oust the
president. Although the referendum on dollarization failed, it showed the scope of their
influence. They shifted from a concept creator to a national player in governmental
affairs through this event, as they had to work closely alongside the government on
specific concessions. They gained a certain level of trust with the government and made
the government realize that the goals of the indigenous people are closely aligned, or
overlap with the goals of the government. By ousting President Mahuad with the help of
the police and armed forces in Ecuador, they brought the indigenous movement to the
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center of policy decision-making. Conversely, CAM does not have a relationship that is
open to communication with the Chilean state because the Chilean state has labeled
them as a terrorist organization. Their relationship is based upon arrests instead of
compromises.
CONADI, created in 1994 by the Chilean government, gives the illusion that the
society is receptive to change, but it fails to unify indigenous people and does not have
success in working alongside other organizations. CONADI is significantly less successful
than CONAIE in Ecuador and the indigenous people of Chile have not formed an
organization that is as large as CONAIE. A 2006 survey reports that only 40% of Chilean
Mapuche have confidence in the abilities of CONADI to represent them (CEP 2006).
CONADI demonstrates that the society is not open to change; based upon the structural
strain theory, this is a cause of failure. Before the Indigenous Law that established
CONADI was even passed, right-wing senators removed final provisions that set up
procedures for consultation with indigenous communities (Sznajder 2003). Furthermore,
the director of CONADI is not indigenous - this is a failure of the indigenous social
movement in Chile. If they cannot represent themselves in indigenous organizations, this
indicates a failure to be a national player in politics. My analysis indicates that the failure
to unite the indigenous people of Chile and form a group like CONAIE, or a popular
bottom-up indigenous political party alludes to a failure of the Mapuche social
movements.
The Mapuche make up a small percentage of the population in Chile, so it is
understandable that they will not create motion as affectively as the indigenous people in
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Ecuador; they simply do not have the numbers. However, they do not have success in
regions that are heavily populated by Mapuche and do not have success working through
organizations that supposedly support indigenous rights. Two indigenous men, Domingo
Namuncura and Moises Huenchelaf were removed from the position as director of
CONADI in the 1990s because they opposed the construction of Ralco Dam, which was a
detrimental failure on their goals on land reclamation. Huenchelaf voiced his skepticism
upon his resignation:
I became an obstacle to the implementation of a political-economic path that
does not take into consideration the damage it can signify to the indigenous
population… Those in government who believe that this institution is simply
another instrument for the state to accommodate a diversity of interests are
wrong… [the president’s intervention] will only provoke an end to the pact
between the state and indigenous peoples (Diario Austral 1997).
Two more men were removed from office for opposing the Ralco Dam, so the new
director swore to vote in favor of the dam before he was voted into CONADI (Rodriguez
and Carruthers 2008, 7). A non-indigenous man was named director to protect the large
hydroelectric company in 1998 (Gonzales 1989). The government established these
organizations to improve the strained relationship between the state and the indigenous
people, but when the government faced opposition from constituents towards
indigenous recognition, they stripped CONADI of its intended goals and placed nonindigenous people over the organization (Rodriguez and Carruthers 2008, 3). This is a
huge failure. CONADI is influenced by the government instead of influencing the
government. They achieve small successes, but do not have the power to successfully
represent the Mapuche people. At Ralco Dam, the Mapuche people did not gain support
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from the police, or other governmental entities. Conversely, in one of the most successful
events in the social movement in Ecuador is the coup that removed President Mahuad, in
which the indigenous people had help from the Ecuadorian police and armed forces, who
left their posts at the door, so that the indigenous people would be able to enter the
Legislative Palace.

Table 1: Mapuche Representation as Councilors
Year

Region

Percent Candidates
Mapuche

Percentage Votes
Mapuche

Mapuche Winners

1992

Santiago

6.45

6.45

2

2004

Bio-Bio

47.06

60.40

4

2008

Bio-Bio

60.00

72.14

5

2012

Bio-Bio

59.26

65.00

5

2012

Araucanía

40.00

27.94

4

2016

Santiago

2.04

1.29

0

2016

Araucanía

43.33

32.06

1

2016

Bio-Bio

15.15

14.83

1

Source: “Mapuche Representation 1989-2017,” Mapuche Data Project, accessed 7 December 2019.

Figure 1: Mapuche Population 2011
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Source: Lewis, Martin. 2015. Geocurrents, information from 2013 Casen Study.

Figure 1 is presented for reference while I analyze governmental representation; it shows
the population density of Mapuche in the different regions of Chile. Table 1 presents the
percentage of Mapuche city council members elected in areas of highly populated
indigenous populations. The data comes from the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas. The
percentage of Mapuche votes is not too different from the percentage of Mapuche
people in those areas. However, the data only shows winners of city council. This is
because they did not have success in the elections of deputy, mayor, or senate
throughout most of the years. While city councilors work on and vote on city finances,
infrastructure improvements, and other major projects, the national government still has
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the power to allow outside companies to buy land when they determine it will help the
national economy. In the recent 2017 election, the Mapuche people in the Araucanía
region gained some success in the senate election with about 20% of the candidates
being Mapuche. The areas with the highest concentration of Mapuche people are
Araucanía, Bío-Bío, and metropolitan Santiago. The problem lies in Santiago. This area
with a high concentration of Mapuche people fails to elect councilors to represent them
in the capital. Also, we should see more success in the Araucanía and Bío-Bío regions
because there are more Mapuche representatives, but we see little progress in the
acquisition of demands. Yet, as I discussed already, the senators in Congress want to
please the masses, so they will largely disregard indigenous demands if they face
opposition from the majority. Whereas, in Ecuador, the majority of citizens have
indigenous blood along with Spanish blood, so Congress may not face as much opposition
regarding indigenous reforms and the political atmosphere welcomes change as there is
government turmoil; this allows different groups to voice their demands so that the
government may be restructured to become more stable. Furthermore, the Mapuche
have very little representation in Congress. There are 155 deputies and 50 senators in
Chile. The indigenous population of Chile constitutes about 10% of the total population,
so there should be about 20 indigenous representatives in Congress. Yet they only
elected 4 into office from 2012-2017. This is another failure of the indigenous social
movement in Chile. The indigenous people cannot unify to elect candidates to office and
the rest of society does not elect them.
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Indigenous political parties are an indicator of success of social movements. In
Ecuador, the party Pachakutik is an active party that helped elect Gutiérrez in 2002.
Through this political party, they enter the political scene. There is not a successful
equivalent in Chile. There is an attempted political party, called Wallmapuwen. However,
there is almost no news about their successes, failures, or actions. This indicates that
they are not successful, have no support, and cannot serve as an option in which to enter
the political scene with the current level of support. This is understandable through the
small population of Mapuche. However, my analysis indicates that this success is
contingent on parties, like Pachakutik, to gain representation in the government, so that
the government may be receptive.
Ecuador provides a useful contrast to Chile because I am able to analyze the
period in which they had success in comparison with their deteriorating success rate.
Today in Ecuador, this political party, Pachakutik, is losing support as a result of
infighting, support lost from goals no longer aligning with other political organizations,
and financial struggles. CONAIE also struggles today. In Ecuador today, the social
movement is failing alongside Pachakutik and CONAIE. The indigenous people are no
longer able to achieve their day to day goals of halting oil drilling on their ancestral lands,
which is not an issue in which the non-indigenous are focused because the economy will
create better opportunities for them and the land destruction has no immediate effects
towards them. They are not successful in their day-to-day demands, but find success
when united with other groups. Researcher James Bowen describes CONAIE’s
relationship with the state with the term multicultural market democracy, which he says
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“fulfills each of these functions [multiculturism, economic liberalism, political democracy]
by incorporating indigenous peoples into the political system but excluding demands and
tactics that undermine elite political power” (Bowen 2011, 480). One example to support
this claim is that President Lenín Moreno was forced to restore fuel subsidies after
violent protests in the capital, Quito, in October 2019 (Weisbrot 2019). Moreno
announced Decree 883 that would cut subsidies to energy, which made fuel prices
double, so that vulnerable communities could not afford gas; Moreno rescinded the
Decree because it affected the masses, but he does not respond to many demands by
only the indigenous. Many organizations protested, but Moreno requested peace talks
with CONAIE. This is a success of the indigenous people because they have established
their organization as a change-maker, but it also demonstrates the tactics used by the
government to choose which demands to grant and which to ignore. They have most
success in a time of political turmoil when their ideology aligns with other groups.

Table 2: Survey of Participation in Manifestations (percent of total protesters that are
indigenous)
Percent Indigenous
Chile

Ecuador

2008

—

19.2

2010

—

7.6

2012

9.1

—

2014

3.2

—

2016

9.5

4.6

Source: Alguna vez en su vida, ¿ha participado usted en una manifestación o protesta púb.
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Query November 29, 2019. Data set Chile 2016 from The Latin American Public Opinion Project:
http://lapop.ccp.ucr.ac.cr, November 29, 2019.

Table 2 shows the participation of people in manifestations, or protests that are
indigenous drawn from LAPOP data. In 2008, indigenous people in Ecuador protested for
constitutional reform that would recognize Ecuador as a plurinational state. As seen in
Table 2, 19.2% of all of those that protested, in any protest, in 2008 in Ecuador were
indigenous. They came together when there was a time with a specific need. They
achieved their goal when a high percentage of indigenous people participated in the
events. Furthermore, about 72% of the population of Ecuador is mestizo, or mixed
Spanish and indigenous (World Bank). Since 2016, there has been an upsurge in the
conflicts in the regions where Mapuche are concentrated in Chile. In 2016, 9.5% of those
responding to the survey said that they were indigenous and participated in protests in
the last year. This alludes to an increase in Mapuche participation; therefore, we should
see more success. However, as I discuss in the following paragraph, there are multiple
themes in which these conflicts focus, so there is little unity which prohibits
achievements.
Data indicates that there were 11,518 manifestations, or protest events between
2012 and 2017, which averages to 2,304 per year (Garretón 2018). However, from 2015
to 2016, only 136 of the manifestations were reported to be related to the Mapuche
conflict. This indicates that there is a lack of focus on the Mapuche conflict. There are
other social movements occurring at the same time, so the Mapuche social movement is
overshadowed by others, such as the women’s movement and the student movement.
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Furthermore, many Mapuche are students and women, so they may choose to focus
their energy on protesting alongside the other movements and lose time for a Mapuche
protest. There is a low percentage of Mapuche protests in comparison with all Chilean
protests and data reveals that there is a lack of unity in the themes of Mapuche protests.
This is a factor that causes social movements to fail. They are not united on one issue
because Mapuche communities are divides regionally, instead of ethnically. Many
Mapuche people disagree on the use of violence against the police during
manifestations, so they cannot be united with this foundational issue of how
manifestations should occur—with violence or without (Rodriguez and Carruthers 2008,
13). In the 136 actions related to the Mapuche conflict, 45.5% were related to identity,
24.3% were related to legal measures, and the remaining 30.3% surrounded land rights.
The Mapuche people were too widely split in regards to their priorities, so they lack
representation numbers, as well as a common theme that unites different manifestations
across time and space.
One of the Mapuche demands is to be recognized constitutionally as an
autonomous people. The demand was similar for the indigenous people of Ecuador. They
wanted a plurinational state with constitutional recognition, which they achieved with
the constitutional reform of 2008. A survey published in 2006 (CEP 2006) indicates
reason for failure in the case of the Mapuche. In successful social movements,
constituents must show up in numbers and be unified. The Mapuche live in different
geographical regions: urban Santiago and rural Araucanía. Regarding a question about
what problems the government should prioritize, the urban and rural Mapuche answered
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differently. The concerns of the rural Mapuche focused more on unemployment. The
answers of rural Mapuche indicate that they are just trying to survive and want land to
live. The urban Mapuche are more focused on constitutional recognition. Until they can
unify in their priorities, they will not be a successful social movement.
Data indicates potential success for the Mapuche social movement in the future,
as the political climate becomes less rigid and student demands coincide with indigenous
demands. However, they are unsuccessful. Social movement success depends on the
acronym WUNC: worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment. Ecuador demonstrates
each of these characteristics. For example, they have a stated cause by which many are
affected and they have one overarching theme and every other claim is related to the
umbrella theme. They accumulate numbers in protests, road blockages, and signatures
on petitions and they are committed in their resistance through a presidential coup. The
unsuccessful Mapuche social movement lacks unity, protests are not connected across
regions, or years, and they do not have the same numbers as the indigenous people of
Ecuador. The data indicates that a lack of unity prevents successful representation, which
keeps a group from gaining momentum, national support, and a voice. Therefore, I fail to
accept my hypothesis that unity is the key to indigenous success, rather it is a step in
gathering support to make the society receptive to change.
Today, a decline in the success of Ecuador’s indigenous people is obvious and
they experience similar land rights issues as the Mapuche. The indigenous people of
Ecuador had success in uniting people when the government was having economic issues
and their goals aligned with the goals of others, not just the goals of indigenous peoples.
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Now, Pachakutik does not draw the same support as it did after its formation and is not
as united as it once was as a result of struggles with finances and infighting (Valencia and
Stargardter 2019). They had success when they ousted a president that did not have
popular support and supported a widely supported president. They began to fail when
they backed Luis Macas instead of the more popular candidate Rafael Correa. They are
successful when they have the support of other political groups, yet in order for this to
happen, they need to have aligning goals. CONAIE has some success because the politics
are unstable and many other citizens recognize the corruption; they have success when it
makes political sense. Chile has had a relatively stable government since Pinochet, so the
government is not receptive to change.
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Conclusion

The Mapuche social movement is unsuccessful as a result of an unreceptive
society to change. A lack of unity within the group and with the general population and a
strained relationship with the state that makes it difficult for the other Chileans and
respected political parties to align their goals with the Mapuche, so their cause does not
seem worthy for the masses. The indigenous people of Ecuador established a
communication network between the indigenous people and the Ecuadorian state, so
that they may have power in the national government. As a result, they achieved a
constitutional reform and ousted two presidents with help from the police and armed
forces. The indigenous social movement now fails because they do not have unity with
the general population and the alliance with respected political groups.
In the terms of social movement theories, the structural strain theory is most
useful to explain why the social movement of Ecuador was successful, whereas, the
Mapuche in Chile do not achieve success and Ecuador’s now fails. The resource
mobilization theory is the most basic theory and says that a community with a grievance
can help alleviate the grievance with a mobilization of resources, including money, labor,
social status, knowledge, support of the media, and support from the elite. In my
analysis, it is not indicated that the Mapuche are any more successful with the resource
of CONADI than they were before the formation of CONADI. Also, the indigenous people
of Ecuador gained support as their movement became more successful, so this does not
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provide convincing evidence that a change in resources leads to the successes, or failure,
of the indigenous social movements.
The structural strain theory is similar to the resource mobilization theory, but it
has one descriptor that is key to success. There are six requirements for a social
movement to be successful: people in society experience deprivation, people recognize
the deprivation, a solution is proposed, events occur to begin motion of the movement,
the society needs to be open to change, and there will be mobilization of resources. The
most important aspect in this to explain the successes and failures is that society, or the
government, must be in a position to be open to change. There must be a strain in
society that creates holes in a system that must be filled. The Mapuche experienced a
deprivation—lack of government recognition that led to land privatization—and the
people recognized this and began planning protests. However, the society is not very
open to change and there is a lack of unity in the solutions proposed for their
deprivation; both of these facts makes it impossible to have success in a social
movement. Conversely, the indigenous people of Ecuador acted through each step to
gain success; one form of success is constitutional reform. They recognized that they did
not have a nationally recognized identity, so they formed a political party and opened
communication networks between different groups of indigenous people so that they
were able to unite around 16 demands. The society was open to change, in large part
because the majority of Ecuadorians have some indigenous blood and there was an
economic crisis in which the majority were affected when their first measurable success
came to fruition. The difference between the case in Chile and Ecuador according to the
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structural strain theory is the level of manifestation organization and unity and openness
to change from others.
The new social movement theories do a better job of explaining why social
movements begin in the first place. The resource mobilization theory and the structural
strain theory are best used to understand how social movements gain success. The new
social movement theories focus on culture and identity as a catalyst for social
movements. They also defend personal autonomy and resist government expansion. This
explains both the beginnings of the social movement of indigenous people in Ecuador
and Chile, but does not offer an explanation as to why the Mapuche do not have success
when they do defend personal autonomy and resist government expansion. Therefore, I
rely on the structural strain theory.
I expected more contrast between the two movements than I found in my
research. My research has indicated that Ecuador’s indigenous movement is not as
successful as I previously thought. While they did succeed for many years, they are no
more successful now than the indigenous movement in Chile. Therefore, while unity in
demands is important and Mapuche people in Chile lack the unity that CONAIE brought in
Ecuador, this is not the only cause of failure. Ecuador is about 25% indigenous and the
majority of the population identifies as mestizo, whereas Chile is only 10% indigenous. It
makes sense that indigenous people in Ecuador would be more represented in the
government because the country, including the economy, depends majorly on the
indigenous people. In Chile, they simply do not have the numbers to require such big
strides by the government to keep the country at peace and they do not have enough
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support to elect a president. It is evident, too, that Chile’s government still has not fully
recovered from the restrictive Pinochet era, so the country is not in a place for any social
movement to succeed, including those advocating for students’ and women’s rights. As
the government continues to recover in the coming years, it will be evident whether or
not this is the reason behind the failures of the indigenous people in Chile.
In conclusion, the Mapuche case is unsuccessful because they do not have
support from the elite and they do not have the proper organization throughout the
country to organize unified demands and manifestations in different regions. In order to
be successful, they must clearly define their demands and work together with others, not
just the indigenous people, to gain a voice on the national level to enact change.
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